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' illions of Americans open their e-mail in the
morning and receive a full inbox of "I can get you
out of debt, fast,""OrderViagra here" or "She'll say
wow."These e-mails are more than a mere annoyance
to corporations or Internet Service Providers (ISPs)
who must process the billions of unsolicited
messages sent daily. The average person receives
2,200 unsolicited messages per year and the average
corporation receives 2. I million unsolicited e-mails
per every thousand employees.' It is estimated that
U.S corporations spent almost nine billion dollars
to combat these unsolicited e-mail messages in 2002,
and that number is sure to rise.2 This is to say nothing
about the costs borne by ISPs and passed along to
their customers.
Unsolicited e-mail is generally referred to
as "spam" and is considered a socially undesirable
by-product of the Internet.3 Almost all users of e-
mail have been or will be on the receiving end of
spam.4 There is little doubt as to the reason for the
massive amount of spam generated. Spam is
produced at little or no cost to the sender and can
be sent to many recipients at one time.5
The recipients of the e-mail, the ISP
processing the e-mail, or the corporation providing
Internet access to employees bears the cost of spam.
Spam shifts traditional costs from senders to e-mail
users and is the equivalent to "sending junk mail with
postage due or making telemarketing calls to
someone's pay-per-minute cellular phone."6
Unsolicited e-mail has a negative effect on all users
because consumers subsidize efforts to combat these
unwanted e-mails. 7
Although advertisers were one of the first
groups to use the Internet for commercial business
and are the most prolific generators of spam, they
are not the only spammers.8 Private citizens have
begun to utilize e-mail and the capabilities of spam
to widely distribute information.' Individuals can
utilize e-mail communication to distribute
information about volunteer opportunities, political
propaganda, or religious messages.This phenomenon
further illustrates that the content of the messages
is not the most important aspect of spam. Rather, it
is the amount of e-mail'0 sent; spam from private
individuals can be just as damaging as those of a
commercial nature."
This Note will discuss the issue of non-
commercial spam through the prism of a case
recently decided by the California Supreme Court,
Intel v. Hamidi.12 Until recently there was no federal
regulation for unwanted electronic communication"
and common law was the only potential solution.'
4
Part I of this Note will discuss the nature of spain,
focusing on the distinction between commercial e-
mail and bulk e-mail and the importance therein.
Part II will detail the history and the legal doctrine
of trespass as it applies to the Internet. Part III will
summarize the case of Intel v. Hamidi as it struggled
to apply the doctrine of trespass to the electronic
medium of the Internet.Various legal justifications
for a solution to spam will be presented. PartV will
examine the potential for a market-based solution
and assess recent federal legislation aimed at the
problem.
1.I7 Na tre of' uS pm
Spam exploits the advantages of the
Internet and extols great costs upon the receivers
of such e-mail. Despite the size of the problem and
broadness of impact, there is no set definition of
spam. The two most commonly accepted
characterizations of spam are unsolicited bulk e-mail
and unsolicited commercial e-mail. 5
Common to both definitions is the
characteristic of being an "unsolicited"
communication.
Unsolicited is defined by
case law as having "no
prior relationship
between the parties and S
the recipient has not
explicitly consented to t
receive the s
communication" or "the
recipient has previously f
sought to terminate the
relationship, usually by
instructing the other
party not to send any
more communications in the future"'.
6
Unsolicited bulk e-mail is further
characterized by the term "bulk." Because spain is
harmful based upon the number of e-mail messages
sent at one time, many believe this to be the
appropriate defining terminology. Bulk is roughly
identified as"a single message sent to a large number
of recipients."' 7 These messages do not have to be
identical, but rather substantially similar messages
to qualify under the term "bulk."' 8 Unsolicited bulk
e-mail could therefore be sent by an ordinary person
or a legitimate organization for a well intended
purpose; however, the content of the message or
the purpose behind the message is not evaluated
when terming the message spam.While unsolicited
bulk e-mail gains its characteristic from the number
and volume of messages, unsolicited commercial e-
mail (UCE) is characterized by the content of its
message.
The industry generally refers to commercial
spam as "any message that promotes the sale of
goods or services." '9 Much of the thrust of case law
and legislation has addressed UCE.,°There are many
engaged in this debate that would prefer restricting
any. discussion of sparn to that designated as UCE
because: (I) the originators of spain shift costs to
the receiver of the e-mail in order to make a profit;
(2) it avoids the need to specify exactly how many
e-mails constitute bulk; (3) some non-commercial
speech, such as political speech, may have more
Constitutional protections than commercial speech;
and (4) there is enacted legislation pertaining to
commercial speech with regard to telephone and
facsimile transmission that could provide a template
for future legislation."
While this approach is sensible, it fails to
address the practical and real harms of unsolicited
e-mail.As the objectionable nature of spain occurs
because of its volume and not content,22 it arguably
makes more sense to use the unsolicited bulk e-
mail definition of spam. Although individuals,
legitimate organizations and businesses may not want
to think of their activities as contributing to the spam
problem, it is imperative that a discussion to combat
spam center around destructive messages whatever
their source. Furthermore, in the recent cases, the
court made no distinction between an e-mail sent
for commercial purpose and one sent for another
purpose. The focus was on the effect of those e-
mails, not the content.2 4
The judicial system is currently addressing
this vexing problem because of the effects of
unsolicited bulk e-mail, the high costs associated with
both time and resources, and the lack of a workable
legislative or market driven solution. However,
transferring the regulation of the Internet from
Congress or state legislatures to the court system
requires the use of an existing legal doctrine. Plaintiffs
have laid the foundation of their case on the principle
of trespass and private property.The Internet is the
newest application for the trespass principle, normally
applied to a tangible entity.
The costs of unsolicited bulk e-mail have
driven creative legal thinkers to use the doctrine of
trespass to enjoin distributors of spam.These creative
thinkers resurrected an uncommonly used doctrine:
trespass of chattel.Trespass is a cause of action based
in common law and has emerged from desuetude
to become a central figure in cyberspace law."
Trespass was first utilized in an electronic medium
to punish "hacking" 26 and was then extended to
address the problems of destructive commercial
spam.
"Unlawful interference, however slight, with
the enjoyment by another of his personal property
is a trespass."27 The Second Restatement of Torts
describes a trespass of chattel as "(a) dispossessing
another of the chattel, or (b) using or intermeddling
with the chattel in the possession of another."
2
Chattel is defined as "an article of personal property,
as distinguished from real property" and "may refer
to animate as well as inanimate property."2 9 Section
(a) of the definition requires "dispossession" or an
"ouster" and is generally not applicable in cases
involving an electronic medium.30 However,
"intermeddling" is applicable to electronic media
because spamming can interfere with the possessory
interest of another through unauthorized use of their
computer network. " This has become the hook
upon which plaintiffs have chosen to hang their hats.
An intermeddler is liable only if his actions
are harmful to the "possessor's materially valuable
interest in the physical condition, quality, or value of
the chattel, or if the possessor is deprived of the
use of the chattel for a substantial time, or some
other legally protected interest [is harmed]."32 Actual
damage must occur but the harm does not have to
be substantial. 11 Physical contact with the chattel is
required to constitute intermeddling; however, the
parameters of physical contact are not completely
clear.1
4
The California Supreme Court held that
even indirect touching or entry might give rise to a
trespass." Nevertheless, giving rise to trespass does
not necessarily give rise to damages.3 6 In order to
recover more than nominal damages, the plaintiff
"must prove the value of the property taken or that
he has sustained some special damage. '3 7 Proving
damage in the intangible world of the Internet has
presented an especially difficult challenge.
The doctrine of trespass of chattel as applied
in the context of cyberspace has stretched the
application of trespass from the physical world to
an intangible one.The following cases describe the
evolution and application of this doctrine to modern
technology.The result is a roadmap, the parameters
by which unsolicited e-mail may be regulated, either
by the government or private parties availing
themselves of the judicial system.
In order to sustain a cause of action for
trespass by computer, the plaintiff must demonstrate
an object on which a person could trespass and a
mechanism for that trespass to take place. Thrifty-Tel,
Inc. v. Bezenek" stands for the proposition that an
electronic signal is sufficiently tangible to support a
trespass cause of action.39 The receipt of an
electronic signal on a proprietary computer system
is sufficient to qualify as a contact. This is the first
step toward bringing an arcane bit of common law






with a six-digit access
code to utilize the
system. 40 The
defendants in Thrifty-Tel
used a home computer
to tap into the
proprietary computer network and acquire the six-
digit access codes needed to make telephone calls
on the system.4 These actions overburdened the
telephone system and resulted in the denial of
service to consumers.
42
Thrifty-Tel sued the defendants on a theory
of trespass to chattel, which the court identified as
"an intentional interference with the possession of
personal property that has proximately caused
injury.'" 4 1 The court held the electronic signals
generated by the defendant's home computer were
sufficiently tangible to constitute trespass and the
denial of service to some of its customers as the
required damage.44 This was the first California
decision to recognize a trespass claim in the context
of Internet communication. The theory of trespass
did not remain exclusive to computer hacking in
cyberspace cases. Quickly, the theory expanded to
e-mail related activities.
Hacking is understandably wrong as it is the
computer equivalent of breaking into someone's
house to steal. However, hacking is not the same as
sending spam because unsolicited e-mail uses
legitimate means to access the computer system.
CompuServe v. Cyber Promotions4" held that the
intentional use of an ISP's proprietary computer
equipment was an actionable trespass to chattel.
46
This is the first application of trespass doctrine to
e-mail communication. 4
CompuServe was a national commercial
online computer service operating through a
propriety nationwide computer network.4 1
CompuServe provided subscribers access to its
network and a gateway to the Internet, which, in
turn, permitted e-mail messages.49 The defendants
sent unsolicited e-mail advertisement - spain - on
behalf of themselves and on behalf of their clients.5 0
CompuServe subscribers received the unsolicited
e-mail advertisements."'
CompuServe requested the defendants
cease their activities, which were burdening their
computer system, and employed technological means
to block the flow of transmission." Both measures
were unsuccessful." CompuServe sued under a
trespass to chattel claim, and the court held the
conduct of transmitting a substantial volume of
electronic data in the form of unsolicited commercial
e-mail to the plaintiff's computer system was in fact
a violation of the trespass doctrine and met the
necessary requirements for the court to intervene.
The value of CompuServe's computer
equipment was wholly derived from the extent it
functions appropriately.4 The spam sent by the
defendants placed a burden on CompuServe's
computer system resulting in lower utilization
abilities for CompuServe's clients. The value of the
computer equipment diminished, even though not
physically damaged. 11 As required under a claim for
trespass to chattel, the court concluded that there
was both contact and
damage as required




declared that the owner
of the computer system
N Imust first notify the
potential trespasser that
the e-mail is unwanted
and that he considers
m n further action to be a
trespass .1 7 It also
required that the owner
of the computer system
take reasonable self-help
measures before legal action is proper. 11 Resulting
in the unauthorized use of a proprietary e-mail
system for commercial e-mail,"spam" in a manner
that exceeded the consent of the owner, constituted
a trespass of chattel. 11
America Online, Inc. v. IMS60 found a
commercial spammer committed a trespass to
chattel against a privately owned computer
network.6 AVirginia court held that one can be liable
I IN " F! E R N Ft 1- & T 6E
for trespass to a chattel if the chattel is impaired as
to its condition, quality or value.62 America Online
(AOL) is an ISP and brought suit against those
involved in sending unauthorized commercial e-mail
advertisements to AOL subscribers. 6 AOL claimed
the defendants sent over 60 million unsolicited e-
mail messages in a 10-month period.64 These e-mails
required AOL to spend both technical resources and
additional staff resources to defend its computer
system against the messages.6 s
AOL requested the defendants cease their
activities and administered self-help techniques but
was unsuccessful in curtailing the messages.6 6 The
court relied upon CompuServe to settle the
applicability of a trespass claim to unsolicited
commercial e-mail.67 Using the same rationale, the
transmission of unsolicited commercial e-mail can
be a trespass. " The law is settled that an ISP may
avail itself of trespass to chattel if its computer system
is damaged or its ability to meet the demands of its
customers is minimized, as long as reasonable efforts
have been made to stop unwanted messages. The
next question the court confronts is whether this
doctrine can apply to a private network server.
E-Bay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc.69 extended the
protection of trespass to chattel from an ISP to the
private owner of a computer network. The court
held an online auctioneering company (E-Bay) was
likely to prevail upon a claim of trespass and therefore
-issued a preliminary injunction.7" "Trespass to chattel
lies where an intentional interference with
possession of personal property has proximately
caused injury.' The court defined the test related
to trespass of chattel to be as follows: "the plaintiff







u rproximately resulted in
damage to plaintiff'
7 2






granted to the public.73
The defendants engaged
in activity that constantly searched and gathered
information from the E-Bay site and posted that
information on their own website. 74 This
unauthorized access occurred approximately
100,000 times a day.7 The defendants' actions
resulted in a reduction of system performance and
system unavailability, as well as data lOSS. 76 E-Bay did
not permit or condone the type of activity conducted
by the defendants and, therefore, the court believed
the defendants committed a trespass. 77The doctrine
was extended to address damage to ISPs resulting
from large volumes of unsolicited e-mail to combat
attacks using the Internet.
As in CompuServe and America Online, E-Bay
attempted self-help measures to stop the
unauthorized access and requested the defendant
cease its activities. 7 Furthermore, the court did not
require a substantial showing of damage or
interference with possession, but importantly, it held
intermeddling constituted a diminishment of
condition, quality or value of the personal property.79
Despite the fact that the defendant did not unduly
stress the computer system, any use of the private
computer system is as an unlawful use of another's
private property. 80
Trespass to chattel is an accepted, if not
settled, doctrine prohibiting unauthorized use of
another's computer system.The courts all utilized a
definition of trespass of chattel, which included both
an interference or contact element and a damage
element. 11 All the courts required a showing of
contact with the computer system.82 This portion of
their analysis took relatively little discussion because
the courts generally accepted the proposition that
electronic signals constitute a tangible trespass or
contact with the proprietary computer system.83 The
signals between the offending computer and the
proprietary computer system were sufficient.
The courts did not find that contact alone
sufficient to constitute trespass. The plaintiff must
have employed self-help measures to solve the
offending transmissions. 84 The owners of the
computer systems must have put the offending
transmitters on notice that their actions were to
cease. The contact issue is settled law; if a computer
contacts another computer using the Internet's mode
of electronic signals, then the contact is sufficient to
produce a trespass as long as there is notification to
the spammer that his actions are unacceptable.
Damage is the first requirement to establish
a trespass claim. 86 However, the amount of damage
and the concreteness of the damage is not well
defined. Utilization of computer resources in a
manner distracting from their intended purpose is
damage. The analysis must be one of degree. The
true issue is the legitimate use of a computer system.
Utilization in higher amounts than normally
permitted or expected by a user is the defining
characteristic between tort liability and acceptable
activity. Some of the activity had an impact on the
utilization of services the provider was paid to
administer; however, others had little to no
recognizable impact on the delivery of services.
Damage is required, but the parameters are not yet
completely defined. Even a finding of damage to the
system did not necessarily result in damages payable
to the Defendant, if the damage to the system cannot
be appropriately quantified.
7
Granting the validity of the doctrine of
trespass in the context
of the Internet and
specifically e-mail still
does not resolve the
fundamental question of
whether the defining
feature of a trespass
should be the content or
the volume of the e-mail.
t The outlaw of
unsolicited commercial
e-mail, such as that in
CompuServe, still brings
to question whether the
doctrine should be
extended to e-mail sent
for noncommercial
endeavors.The parameters of noncommercial speech
are more precarious because the right to free speech
and freedom of expression seem more at odds with
the ability to restrict e-mail messages.
An individual seemingly has a strong interest
in utilizing the Internet to spread ideas and
disseminate information. However, the rights of a
private property are still present and could be
adversely affected. The extension of this doctrine
can have serious implications on political speech,
work-related speech, and even personal private
speech.
The application of tort law to
communications outside the commercial realm has
serious and differing consequences. The broad
application of trespass law to all unwanted e-mail
utilizing a proprietary e-mail system could have
implications to everyone using the Internet. The
potential consequences could have a serious impact
on the freedom of communication between
individuals. Ignoring the serious impact of bulk e-
mail from individuals and organizations will severely
effect the value of any solution because bulk e-mail
from legitimate sources can have just as negative an
impact on corporations, ISPs and individuals as
commercial e-mail.
California has just decided the test case for
the application of trespass to chattel to an individual's
bulk e-mail activities.The California Supreme Court
was faced with the responsibility of defining the legal
boundaries of e-mail used by millions of people daily
and the result of those activities on private parties.88
The court had a difficult balancing act that literally
had the use of e-mail communication hanging in the
balance.
Ill. IntelA v. amIdi
Intel Corporation was on solid ground when
it filed suit against Ken Hamidi in 1998 based upon
the intellectual framework created in cases such as
Thrify- Tel, CompuServeAOL, and E-Bay. Courts seemed
willing to protect proprietary computer systems
from assaults committed using the Internet. However,
the California Supreme Court declined to extend
the doctrine of trespass to chattel to permit it to
deny an individual from using its propriety server to
disseminate thousands of unsolicited e-mail
messages.
Ken Hamidi was an Intel employee for nine
years before Intel fired him in 1995.89 In response,
Hamidi formed FACE-Intel, an organization dedicated
to providing a forum for
current and former





Hamidi attempted to d
disseminate information
that would generally be
considered private to






between 8,000 and 35,000 e-mails to Intel employees
on six separate occasions. 92 Hamidi ignored all
requests by Intel to cease his e-mails and actively
evaded their self-help attempts to stop his e-mails.
9 3
After being unsuccessful with self-help
measures to block Hamidi's e-mails, Intel filed a
request for a permanent injunction on the theory
that the e-mails constituted a trespass to chattel.
9 4
Intel contends its e-mail system is part of its propriety
computer system dedicated to conducting Intel
business.95 Intel claims the intrusion by Hamidi's e-
mails have resulted in damage to the company.96
Intel asserted Hamidi's e-mails damaged the
company in three primary areas: diminished
productivity; loss of company resources spent
blocking e-mails; and addressing employees' concerns
about the content of the messages.9 They contended
these injuries impaired the value of Intel's proprietary
e-mail system. However, Intel did not maintain the
e-mails sent by Hamidi disabled the computer system
or rendered the system unusable.99
At the outset, many believed Intel could
meet all the criteria required to show trespass to
chattel based upon the unwanted e-mail
communication. Hamidi's e-mail contacted Intel's
proprietary computer system. Intel requested that
Hamidi cease his e-mail communication and
employed self-help measures to combat the
unwanted communication.And Intel believed that it
could show damage by the loss of employee
productivity, the costs associated with the self-help
measures, and cost of employees' time to address
the unwanted email. However, Intel was unsuccessful
in convincing the court that this activity constituted
S,
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a trespass.The California Supreme Court in a split
decision determined that the tort of trespass to
chattels does not "encompass ... an electronic
communication that neither damages the recipient
computer systems nor impairs its functioning. Such
an electronic communication does not constitute
an actionable trespass... because it does not
interfere with the possessor's use or possession of,
or any other legally protected interest in the personal
property itself."'00
This decision severely impacts the ability of
corporations to avail themselves of the judicial
system to stop unsolicited e-mail.The court declined
to extend the doctrine in the manner suggested by
Professor Richard Epstein so that a"company's server
[could] be its castle, upon which any unauthorized
instruction, however harmless, is a trespass" 0' The
court analogized this to a telephone and concluded
that although a telephone conversation may cause
an injury, the injury cannot be defined as trespass
and neither can e-mail received on Intel's server.With
the courts moving toward a liberal definition of
trespass to chattel in order to combat unsolicited
e-mail, it is important to see where the California
Supreme Court saw fit to draw the line between
permissible and impermissible communication.
The court began with the same definition
of trespass used in Thrifty-Tel, "an intentional
interference with the possession of personal
property that has proximately caused injury."'' 0 Since
the court is using the same authority as those
extending the privilege of trespass, the distinction is
in the application of the specific communication.
Specifically, the court states that the dispositive issue
is "whether the undisputed facts demonstrate
Hamidi's actions caused or threatened to cause
damage to Intel's computer system, or injury to its
rights in that personal property"'103




found that Hamidi: (I)
did not damage Intel's
computer hardware or
software; (2) did not
interfere with the use of
the system by Intel; (3)
did not impair the ability
of the computer system
to function efficiently;
and (4) did not cause
Intel to incur any
additional costs to
operate their computer
system.0 4  Trespass
cannot be maintained simply by the receipt of
electronic signals but must show an actual or
potential interference with the proprietary system.
The court concluded that the decisions such as
Thrifty-Tel, CompuServe, and E-Baywere correct in
their application of the trespass doctrine because
actual or potential harm was identified and stemmed
directly from the unsolicited communication.'05
The court summarized Intel's complaint to
be about the content to the messages not the receipt
of the mail.'06 The court stated Intel's theory of
impairment by content would "expand the tort of
trespass to chattels to cover virtually any
uncontested-to communication that, solely because
of its content, is unwelcome to the recipient or
intermediate transmitter" The receipt of unsolicited
e-mail communication by equipment created to
transmit e-mail does not affect Intel's possessory
interest in its proprietary computer system.0 7 The
court did not accept Intel's assertion that diminished
employee productivity due to the receipt of Hamidi's
e-mails constituted harm. 08 Intel permitted its
employees to use the Internet and its e-mail system
for business and, to some extent, personal
purposes.0 9 Therefore, Intel cannot deny minimal
time spent by employees reading and discarding the
Hamidi e-mail was outside the scope of the intended
use of the computer system. " 0
The court was fearful of creating an
environment in which "each of the hundreds of
millions of [Internet] users must get permission in
advance from anyone with whom they want to
communicate and anyone who owns a server
through which their message must travel."'I The
court weighed the rights of corporations to protect
their proprietary systems with the consequences on
the freedom of the e-mail communication for millions
of people worldwide and came down on the side of
e-mail users. However, the court may have taken
too narrow a view when granting freedom of
communication to e-mail users.
Open access to information and the freedom
people associate with cyberspace is critical in





solution to ensure the u
greatest amount of
freedom is retained.
However, it is important I r
to remember the cost of
spam is socially and
monetarily significant.
The cost of
spam derives from the
volume of the messages
sent, not the content.
Both individual
consumers and private p
networks bear the
burden and costs of
those messages. For this reason, any action taken to
curtail spam should include both commercial and
non-commercial bulk e-mail. A solution which
addresses only unsolicited commercial e-mail ignores
the fundamental right upon which any solution should
be based: an individual either has a right to ensure
his privacy, to make conscious decisions about where
to spend his time and money, and to be free of
unwanted intrusion on his private property, or he
does not.The right to privacy, to be free of unwanted
messages and to be free of trespassers, trumps a
spammer's right to send a message, whether or not
that message is commercial in nature.
As discussed above, unsolicited e-mail
messages, regardless of their content, shift the cost
of the transaction from the sender to the receiver.
This is the primary distinction between unsolicited
electronic messages and unwanted physical mail.The
cost-shift to e-mail receivers is astounding. In 2003,
it was estimated that forty percent of all e-mail was
unsolicited commercial e-mail.'' 2 Not only are
servers burdened, but seven percent of Internet users
who switch ISPs do so because of spam." 3 The
consumer directly feels the cost of the unwanted
communication; consumers pay between two and
three dollars more per month due to the high volume
of unsolicited e-mail." I4 In total there is an estimated
ten percent increase in Internet access costs across
the board, as the public must dedicate bandwidth,
storage space,time and attention to its transit, while
the sender pays almost nothing.'I
Cost-shifting alone is a valid social policy
reason to address a technological problem and is
not novel."16The Ninth Circuit previously found that
a cost-shift is a valid reason to restrict commercial
communication with regard to unsolicited faxes.' 7
The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991
regulates the telemarketing industry from sending
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unsolicited facsimile transmissions. "8 The impact of
cost-shifting is recognized as a legitimate social
problem and one that has been addressed in both
the legislative and judicial arenas.
Individuals have a right to privacy' 9 and
unsolicited e-mail messages invade the privacy of an
individual. 20 The Supreme Court acknowledged the
right to privacy explicitly with regard to
advertisements delivered through the U.S. mail.2
The Court stated unequivocally that the senders'
right to communication "must stop at the mailbox
of an unreceptive addressee.' 22 The Court further
went on to say
to hold less would tend to license a
form of trespass and would make
hardly more sense than to say that
a radio or television viewer may not
twist the dial to cut off an offensive
or boring communication and thus
bar its entering the home.. .we see
no basis for according the printed
word or pictures a different or more
preferred status because they are
sent... no one has a right to press
even "good" ideas on an unwilling
subject.
2 3
The right to privacy was gained only by an affirmative
act of an addressee giving notice that he wanted no
further communication from the sender. 4 The right
to privacy was not a complete prohibition of
particular type of e-mail. The right to privacy did
not extend to a blanket prohibition against
unsolicited advertisements on a particular subject
matter but rather gave an individual the right to take
affirmative steps to restrict future e-mail from a
particular sender.' s
The Court acknowledged in Rowan v. United
States Post Office'26 that,"[i]n today's complex society,
we are inescapably captive audiences for many
purposes, but a sufficient measure of individual
autonomy must survive to permit every household
to exercise control over unwanted mail" 2 7 The
Court understood that a changing society and lower
postal rates changed the postman into an "adjunct
of the mass mailer""" The Court and Congress
recognized the changing circumstances in 1970 and
took steps to address the problem of that day and
could extend the same rationale to the new form of
communication: e-mail.
Acknowledging that a common law trespass
theory is applicable in the realm of cyberspace is
the first hurdle in the theory of trespass to chattel.
Central to this discussion is the fundamental right
of ownership of personal property and the ability to
exclude others. 29 If the same actions were taking
place 30 years ago, in a brick and mortar world,
private owners would be able to exclude illegitimate
actors from their premises. °3 0 Therefore, the
application of the common law theory of trespass is
appropriate in certain cyberspace situations.
The sanctity of private property is important




able to maintain a private
i sphere in which their
t ipersonal property is
used for activities of
their choosing and
Sshould not be usurped
by others for their use
without consent.
Trespass should be
available to owners of
computer systems even
if no physical damage
occurs.This is done in reliance upon the Restatement
of Torts, which states,"there may ... be situations in
which the value to the owner of a particular type of
chattel may be impaired by dealing with it in a manner
that does not affect its physical condition." '
L, , u
Granting access to some through a proprietary
computer system should not result in carte blanche
to anyone else wishing to use it in a similar manner.
Any attempt to curtail the use of spam will
necessarily draw into question the restriction of the
senders' right to free speech;this attempt is especially
relevant to unsolicited bulk e-mail sent by individuals
and organizations.'32 An individual is entitled to First
Amendment' protection with regard to
encroachment by the government but not against
private conduct1 4 Courts have held that a private
individual's enforcement of a private property right
with regard to e-mail communication does not
violate the First Amendment.' It is clear that "use
of another's propriety computer equipment is an
actionable trespass and the First Amendment
provides no defense."3 6 However, if legislative action
were taken to restrict an individual's ability to send
certain types of e-mail, then the state may be in fact
acting such a way to curtail a sender's right to free
speech.
The issue of spain is one that requires a
complex balancing test. The cost of spain to
consumers is large but the freedom to use
cyberspace free of regulation is also significant.The
potential curtailment of free-speech could destroy
a fundamental method of communication and could
strip citizens of their First Amendment protections
in the context of cyberspace.This formidable hurdle
should not dissuade people from aggressively seeking
a solution. Nothing less than an individual's right to
control his personal private property is at stake.
The Internet is a bastion of self-regulation.
In its infancy, it survived on "netiquette," which were
informal rules or acceptable use policies that
discouraged unacceptable uses of the Internet.3 7
However, the Internet has grown to over 200 million
Internet users,and informal methods of control alone
are no longer successful in stopping the proliferation
of undesirable activity.' As stated by a leading
Internet group addressing the problem of spain,
"spain is the No. I problem of the Internet and it
affects all of us... The solution is not technical, not
legal, not standardization, but a combination of all of
them and it requires cooperation."'3 9
A pure market-based approach would rely
upon the integrity of Internet users to regulate
themselves 40 or to become regulated based upon
market dynamics.There are a multitude of interested
parties with the ability to come together and identify
universal solutions to the problem of spam. Groups
and forums such as "JamSpam" and the Anti-Spam
Research Group bring the top corporate and
technical participants in the cyberspace market.This
offers a central forum to approach this vexing
problem.There has yet to be a universal solution.
One potential answer to the problem is an
ISP that could offer spam-free e-mail addresses.This
would allow those that wanted to pay an additional
cost to accommodate the mechanism of sorting
spam and allow ISPs the ability to recoup costs.
However, this ignores the technological cat-and-
mouse game that is ongoing between screening
software and spammers. It is unlikely that single bullet
software will stop all spain. In addition, this solution
ignores the impact spain has on the Internet as a
whole. There is a gross distortion of time and
resources dedicated to the issue that is born solely
in the hands of the receivers. Any true market-
solution will have to include a mechanism to bring
the senders into the equation.
Software companies attempt to address the
problem of spain by creating filtering systems at the
receiver's end to remove unwanted e-mails.Thus far,
these are not effective in actually barring unwanted
e-mail and actually sometimes have costs associated
with blocking much desired e-mail communication.
Software companies are looking toward a more novel
approach to the problem. One such solution is to
analyze the volume of e-mail sent from particular
accounts managed by select ISPs, universities, and
corporate sites.' This would attempt to restrict
spain from the sender instead of addressing it on
the user end.
The Anti-Spam Research Group is
attempting to address the problem of spain with a
two-step approach.They are examining the feasibility
of a single architecture that supports a consent-
based system and a framework that would permit
different solutions based upon need. 42 This group
of interested parties formed to directly address the
problem of spam and intends to achieve a solution
based on a principle of consent by the receiver of
the e-mail. This solution obviously has costs, as
procedures and technology would be implemented
to change the dynamics of sending and receiving e-
mail. All of the above are examples of ways in which
the market and Internet "community" have begun
to address the problem of spam.While many people
advocate a rush to the legislature, the market is
creating technology and infrastructure that will both
address the problem and maintain the integrity of
the Internet.
In December 2003, the United States
Congress passed the "Can-Spam" Act to stem the
overwhelming amount of spam. 43 However,
Congress restricted its legislative action to
commercial spam, which, as was discussed, is only
part of the pressing issue. The legislation does
attempt to address the deceptive and misleading
nature of much of the commercial spam. Enforcement
of this law is premised upon being able to identify
the sender of the e-mail and having jurisdiction over
the sender, both of which are far from certain
especially as the world becomes more global.
The nature of the Internet and its technology
is ill suited for legislative control.The ever changing
problems brought on by advancements in technology
and the ingenuity of spammers makes it difficult to
address the issue on a timely basis by a legislative
body. Furthermore, a legislative body necessarily puts
restraints on the system instead of forming a solution
from within the system.
The beauty of an answer based upon market
principles is that the people most affected by the
problem of spam, ISPs and network owners, will be
in a position to address potential solutions. These
affected parties can work together with technological
giants and software pioneers to generate a universal
solution that is acceptable to all the parties.
Until a time comes when this software is
invented, consent based systems are implemented,
or an entirely unknown concept at this time emerges,
private owners still must protect their private
property. The utilization of existing common law
doctrines is both appropriate and wise.There is no
legal distinction between treating an action in one
forum as a crime if that analogous act would be a
crime in another forum. If the actions of a spammer
would be criminal in a "brick and mortar" world
then their actions should be criminal in cyberspace.
The California Supreme Court failed to
utilize the trespass doctrine and in doing so failed
to protect Intel's interest in maintaining the integrity
of its proprietary computer system. If Hamidi
attempted to deliver thousands of letters to Intel's
property or flooded their mail room, his actions
would be illegal. He should not be permitted to
achieve the same goal utilizing the Internet.The harm
does not necessarily come from a physical detriment
to the computer system but rather from having your
property usurped for another's purpose in a way
that one does not approve. Until such a time as there
is an appropriate technological answer to spam,
victims should be able to pursue their rights in the
judicial forum with causes of action already available.
Unfortunately, Congress is trying to legislate in an
area poorly suited to legislation and in a game where
they are sure to lose, as spammers change their
techniques faster than Washington can produce the
paper designed to stop them.
Spam is a significant and increasing social
problem. It has large costs associated with both its
impact to individual receivers and the companies
which supply Internet connectivity. Any solution to
spam needs a multi-faceted approach.The primary
approach should be market-based, working within
the framework of the Internet. However, to the
extent that spammers are successful in usurping the
advantages of the Internet for their own dubious
purposes, there should be a judicial recourse.
The current common law remedies are
acceptable for adaptation in the cyberspace context.
The market does not need additional legislation
outlining the parameters of acceptable and
unacceptable electronic communication. The
boundaries regarding private property are well
established. If an electronic communication
transposed into the "brick and mortar" world would
constitute a trespass, then nothing protects it in the
cyberspace format.
The California Supreme Court had a
remarkable opportunity to hold firm on an
individual's right to privacy, regardless of the context.
The court had the chance to acknowledge that while
the Internet does provide amazing freedoms for its
users, it does not exist in a state free from the
traditional constraints of trespass and responsibility.
Unfortunately, it chose not to protect private
property and, instead, granted unprecedented
freedoms for others to usurp our personal property.
We may never be completely free of
unwanted e-mail, but judicial recourse must be
available when market solutions are not present.
Although the technology is relatively new and
growing rapidly, detrimental harm can occur by
permitting it to operate outside the bounds of law
and create a Wild West atmosphere with regards to
cyberspace.
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